Al-Azaim Media Foundation’s Future Trajectory Amid Declining Propaganda Output on Social Media Platforms

Al-Azaim Media Foundation’s Future Trajectory Amid Declining Propaganda Output on Social Media Platforms  

Abdul Basit and Benjamin Mok 

In 2025, the Islamic State of Khorasan Province’s (ISKP) attacks, overseas plots and propaganda output have substantively declined. The current lull period in ISKP’s activities is longer than usual, compared to previous contraction periods such as the one in October 2022 following the Shah Cheragh shrine attack in the Iranian city of Shiraz.  

Across multiple languages and channels, the quality, quantity, diversity and circulation of Al-Azaim has suffered. Known for producing copious volumes of original and nuanced propaganda, Al-Azaim’s recent contents comprise translations and recirculation of old materials, lacking updated commentary on key global developments concerning the group, such as the Iran-Israel war.  

A combination of factors have disrupted the operations of Al-Azaim Foundation, the group’s propaganda arm. This includes arrests of key ISKP leaders and propagandists in Pakistan, Turkey, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, including the disappearance of a key online moderator who was seemingly arrested in a joint Turkish-Pakistani raid in May; and secondly, the removal of two key content aggregation and dissemination websites, and the crackdown against encrypted channels by a social media company.

ISKP’s high-profile attacks in Russia, Iran and Turkey in 2024 resulted in concerted efforts by regional states and social media companies to roll back the group’s footprint, both online and offline. Following these crackdowns, several Al-Azaim channels migrated from their established platforms to new ones to avoid further disruption and achieve a semblance of stability. The takedown of archiving websites and established channels, responsible for circulation of the group’s official and unofficial propaganda, undermined Al-Azaim’s ability to access content materials, on the one hand, and disrupted regular distribution, on the other.  

For instance, ISKP’s Turkish propaganda channels have stopped altogether. Likewise, the circulation of the group’s flagship monthly English magazine has also been disrupted. In June, Al-Azaim published English magazine’s 37th issue after a three-month gap with no editions published in April and May. It bears mention that Al-Azaim did not publish the English magazine in July as well. 

The suspension of Al-Azaim’s various channels and disruption of its propaganda have created concerns among ISKP’s online supporters about their safety. To address these concerns, Al-Azaim shared a new point of contact in the English magazine’s June issue and urged supporters not to contact people the group has not endorsed. 

The network has been preparing for such an eventuality by increasing operational security awareness. Most recent amongst such initiatives has been the publication of the Light of Darkness articles in Voice of Khurasan. The first article of the series, which was published in March 2024 in Voice of Khurasan’s 27th issue, discussed the importance of the internet and general approaches to safety. The second article (August 2024) highlighted the threat of monitoring and explained digital footprints. The third article (October 2024) discussed platforms and data harvesting. The fourth article (November 2024) drilled deeper into platforms and methods to avoid moderation. The fifth article (March 2025) discussed alternative encrypted platforms. This continued campaign has likely increased the sophistication of network members, who are expected to contribute to efforts in restoring Al-Azaim operations.

Experts have long-since highlighted the resilience of IS’ propaganda apparatuses, attributing it to both strategy and structure. Al-Azaim shows key characteristics of such resilience: firstly, it already has in place a widespread decentralised online network. While this network has thus far mainly been focused on the dissemination of content, it can produce unofficial pro-ISKP content – the August 8 post on one of Al-Azaim’s encrypted social media channels featured such content being shared via Al-Azaim’s official media bot. Secondly, Al-Azaim’s strategic focus has, in recent years, evolved towards garnering support from the global Muslim community, granting it a wider base from which it may draw support. 

There remains a realistic possibility that the outlet will bounce back from its current state. Past studies have shown that while the loss of IS media leaders – as Al-Azaim has allegedly experienced – has led to downward trends in propaganda output, these trends have been acknowledged as largely temporary. Many outlets have bounced back from a crackdown similar to what Al-Azaim experienced, whether through the recuperation of its personnel and platforms or through rebranding and restructuring. 

As such, it is imperative that counterterrorism experts and agencies refrain from complacency by continuing its dismantling of the Al-Azaim network via arrests, while also ensuring that content moderation and platform monitoring remains ahead of the increasing capabilities of threat actors.